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Constitutional Law-Forced Feeding of a Prisoner on a Hunger
Strike: A Violation of an Inmate's Right to Privacy
The "hunger strike" conjures images of starving young men in Northern
Ireland and zealous suffragettes in England. One of the few weapons avail-
able to prisoners, it has received little judicial attention in the United States.
Three state courts, however, have recently faced the legal and moral quandary
presented by a competent, adult prisoner who refuses to eat.' Each court re-
sponded to the inmate's constitutional claims to privacy and freedom of ex-
pression with a superficial analysis of a complex problem. 2 The conflict
between the incarcerated individual's right to bodily autonomy and the com-
peting state interests is not easily resolved. Thorough analysis involves careful
consideration of policies underlying the state interest in preventing the in-
mate's death and evaluation of the inmate's ultimate right to "be let alone."'3
The Georgia Supreme Court was confronted with a hunger-striking in-
mate in Zant v. Prevalle.4 Basing its decision on the right to privacy, it af-
firmed the superior court's order refusing authorization to force feed the
inmate.:5 At the time of the lower court's hearing, Prevatte had not eaten for
twenty-nine days and was refusing further physical examinations.6 The lower
court, noting that Prevatte was rational and apparently sane, suggested that his
actions were motivated by a desire to gain attention from prison officials and
to obtain a transfer to a different prison.7
The state sought authorization to force feed based on its duty to protect
the health of inmates and its interest in preserving life. The superior court
agreed that the state has a duty to protect prisoners and to provide them with
medical care. This duty, the court noted, includes preventing harm to a pris-
oner when it is reasonable to believe he may harm himself. The court held,
however, that this duty does not extend to forced feeding because forced feed-
ing violates the inmate's constitutional right to privacy.8 The court also re-
1. Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87
A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982); State ex rel White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982).
2. This comment will address only the inmate's right to privacy. For a discussion of nonver-
bal acts as symbolic expression, see J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNO, HANDBOOK ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 817-23 (1978). For a discussion of limitations on the prisoner's freedom of
speech, see Comment, A Review of Prisoners' Rights Under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amend-
ments, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 683, 684-88 (1980).
3. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
4. 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982).
5. Id at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
6. Id at 832 n.1, 286 S.E.2d at 716 n.l. An original motion to expedite was denied since
Prevatte had begun to eat. A second motion was granted after Prevatte again stopped eating on
December 29, 1981. At the date of the supreme court's opinion he had not terminated his hunger
strike.
7. Id at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716. Prevatte contended that his life was endangered by other
inmates.
8. Id at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 716. The court stated that a prisoner does not relinquish this
constitutional right because of his status as a prisoner. The court's discussion of the right to pri-
vacy was brief, however, and the court did not elaborate on the relevance of privacy to forced
feeding.
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jected the state's argument that its interest in preserving life compelled
intervention: "To take the State's argument to its logical conclusion, were
Prevatte still under a death sentence the State would ask the Court to allow it
to keep him alive against his will so it could later kill him."9 While the court
acknowledged the state's right to incarcerate and to apply the death penalty, it
declined to extend this right to "destroy a person's will."10
In affirming the lower court's decision the supreme court observed that
Prevatte was competent and had no dependents. Under those circumstances,
Prevatte's right to privacy allowed him to refuse bodily intrusion. I The court
noted that other courts have reached similar results, citing cases in which
courts refused to compel medical treatment. 12
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reached a differ-
ent result in Von Holden v. Chapman.13 The court unanimously affirmed a
lower court order authorizing the Director of the New York Psychiatric Center
to force feed Mark David Chapman in order to sustain his life. 14 At the time
of the hearing, Chapman, who was competent, had not eaten for twenty-two
days. Aware that his refusal to eat would result in death, Chapman stated he
was attempting to draw attention to the world's starving children. 15
The court rejected Chapman's claim to a constitutional right to privacy
on two grounds. First, it equated a hunger strike to suicide, saying "the right
to privacy does not include the right to commit suicide."'16 On the contrary,
the state has a duty to care for persons in its custody and may be liable for
failure to do so. The court also noted that the state has traditionally shown an
interest in preventing self-destruction, evidenced by statutes that address aid-
ing, abetting, and preventing suicide. The court emphasized the high social
value of preservation of life, characterizing suicide as "a grave public
wrong."17 Second, the court perceived important differences between the right
to decline medical treatment, which is based on a privacy interest, and the
right to take one's life. The court concluded that Chapman had no privacy
interest in maintaining a hunger strike.18
9. Id at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 716.
10. Id at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
11. Id
12. The Prevatte court cited Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978);
In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978); In re Yetter, 62
Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northampton County 1973). None of these cases addressed an inmate's
right to refuse medical treatment.
13. 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982).
14. Id at 71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627. Chapman was transferred to the state psychiatric center
from Attica Correctional Facility after two examining physicians certified that he was suffering
from a mental illness likely to result in serious harm.
15. Id at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The court stated that Chapman had frequently expressed
an intention to commit suicide.
16. Id at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
17. Id, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 626 (quoting Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium, 74 F. Supp. 907,
909 (W.D.N.Y. 1947)).
18. Id, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625-26. The court concluded that even if a hunger strike qualifies as
symbolic speech, maintenance of order and discipline within the prison precluded Chapman's
claim to a first amendment right. Id at 70-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
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The New York court's refusal to recognize a privacy right in these cir-
cumstances was sufficient grounds for its decision. The court had an addi-
tional concern, however: the effect of Chapman's hunger strike on the
institution. The hunger strike had caused unit procedural disruption, resent-
ment, and starvation attempts by other inmates.19 The court thus held that
there were three countervailing considerations which outweighed the asserted
rights of the prisoner: the state's obligation to protect the health and welfare
of persons in its custody, the state's interest in the preservation of life, and the
state's interest in maintaining rational and orderly procedures in its
institutions.20
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also authorized forced
feeding, but based its decision on slightly different grounds from those in
Chapman. In State ex rel White v. Narick the court refused an inmate's
prayer for injunctive relief against forced feeding.2 1 White, a murderer serv-
ing a life sentence, began a hunger strike to protest prison conditions in
Moundsville State Penitentiary. Having lost more than one hundred pounds,
he voluntarily ended his fast shortly after the case was argued.22 The court
decided the issue because it was capable of repetition, holding West Virginia's
interest in preserving life superior to White's personal privacy right, which was
limited by incarceration.23
Beginning its analysis with an evaluation of the inmate's constitutional
rights, the court concluded that these rights are limited. The court disagreed
with the Prevatte decision, noting that "[t]he Georgia court failed to consider
compelling reasons for preserving life, not the least being civility."'24 The indi-
vidual's right to privacy, the court said, must be balanced against the state
interest in preserving life.25 The court recognized that the state interest may
be subordinate to the individual's privacy right in some circumstances. Com-
petent, rational patients may refuse medical treatment. The court distin-
guished the patient from the inmate, however. The patient who faces "certain,
painful, uninvited death" may have a protected right of privacy.26 The inmate
who refuses food in protest for a cause that may be "various and unpredict-
able" has no such right.27 Like the Chapman court, the court in White was
concerned with the effect of a hunger strike on the prison system. The court
19. Id at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
20. Id at 66-67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The court had already refused to recognize that the
right to privacy includes the right to starve oneself. Therefore, it was not necessary to weigh these
countervailing considerations.
21. 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982).
22. Id at 55 n.1. The court stated that White had not suffered serious physical deterioration.
23. Id at 58. West Virginia's interest in preserving life was also deemed superior to White's
freedom of expression.
24. Id at 57.
25. Id at 57-58. The court relied on Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). In Saikewicz, the court identified the preserva-
tion of life as an important state interest, which is balanced against an individual's privacy interest
in determining the right to refuse medical treatment.
26. 292 S.E.2d at 58.
27. Id
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noted that hunger strikes in prisons are commonly used to gain attention and
to manipulate prison administrators.
To evaluate a hunger striking inmate's right to reject forced feeding, one
must examine the nature of the right to privacy. It is this right that allows an
individual to determine for himself when bodily intrusions will occur. The
scope of the right "to be let alone" has long been a subject of legal comment.28
Although there is no "right to privacy" specifically articulated in the Constitu-
tion,29 the Supreme Court has found this unwritten constitutional guarantee in
the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, "formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance."'30
The individual's right to control his body as an aspect of privacy has been
addressed by the Supreme Court in a line of cases extending from Griswold v.
Connecticut3t through Roe v. Wade.32 In Griswold the Court held a Connecti-
cut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives by married persons violative of
the right to privacy, which resides in the penumbra of specific guarantees
within the Bill of Rights. The Court stated that these "[v]arious guarantees
create zones of privacy." 33 In Roe v. Wade the Court addressed a woman's
28. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis noted the following in their seminal article on
the individual's right to privacy:
Gradually the scope of... legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has come to
mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the
exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term "property" has grown to comprise
every form of possession-intangible, as well as tangible.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890). The right to make
decisions about one's body is an important value long protected by common law. In Union Pacific
Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court stated that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law." The right to bodily integrity and autonomy has traditionally
received protection under the rule that a physician may not operate on a patient without consent:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent com-
mits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
29. For general information about the right to privacy, see L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 886-990 (1978); Gerety, Redfining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233 (1977);
Huff, Thinking ClearlyAbout Privacy, 55 WASH. L. REv. 777 (1980); Posner, The Uncertain Protec-
tion of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173.
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). According to Professor Tribe:
[Privacy] rights have been located in the "liberty" protected by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. They have been cut from the cloth of
the ninth amendment-conceived as a rule against cramped construction-or from the
privileges and immunities clauses of article IV and of the fourteenth amendment. En-
compassing rights to shape one's inner life and rights to control the face one presents to
the world, they have materialized like holograms from the "emanations" and "penum-
bras"--most recently dubbed simply the "shadows"-of the first, third, fourth, and fifth
amendments. They elaborate the "blessings of liberty" promised in the Preamble, and
have been held implicit in the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments. Wherever located, they have inspired among the most moving appeals to
be found in the judicial lexicon.
L. TRIaE, supra note 29, at 893-94.
31. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. 381 U.S. at 484. This right was extended to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972): "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
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right to terminate her pregnancy. The opinion reviewed the decisions defining
and developing a right to privacy. In defining this right, the Court stated:
"only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in this guarantee of personal pri-
vacy." 34 Governmental regulations limiting fundamental rights may be
justified only by compelling state interests. In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court
concluded that the constitutional right to privacy includes a woman's qualified
right to terminate her pregnancy. The right is qualified by two state inter-
ests-preservation of the pregnant woman's health and protection of the po-
tentiality of human life. 35 The first interest becomes compelling when the risk
of injury to the woman posed by abortion is greater than that posed by child-
birth; the second interest must be protected when the fetus becomes viable. At
either point the state may infringe on the woman's decision.36
The privacy right evolving from Griswold to Roe v. Wade has as its core
the right to control decisions about one's body.37 The Court has neither pre-
cisely defined "fundamental right" nor described what rights it considers "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty." It has yet to decide a case involving a
person refusing to consent to medical treatment. Some hint of at least one
Justice's position may be found, however, in then Circuit Court Judge Bur-
ger's dissenting opinion in Application of the President & Directors of Ge-
orgetown College, in which he characterized the right to privacy as
encompassing a right to refuse medical treatment. 38 His statement was an in-
terpretation of Justice Brandeis' discussion in Olmstead v. United States of the
right to "be let alone."39 In Georgetown the court compelled a blood transfu-
sion against a patient's wishes and later denied a petition for rehearing. Dis-
agreeing with this denial, Judge Burger said:
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
34. 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
35. Id at 162.
36. Id at 164-66. The Court discussed in some detail the extent and impact of the state's
interests at different stages of a woman's pregnancy.
37. One commentator, defining privacy as autonomy or control over the intimacies of per-
sonal identity, suggests the following:
All of this comes in the end to a control over the most basic vehicle of selfhood: the
body. For control over the body is the first form of autonomy and the necessary condi-
tion, for those who are not saints or stoics, of all later forms. Any plausible definition of
privacy, then, whatever the sources of its normative commitments, must take the body as
its first and most basic reference for control over personal identity.
Gerety, supra note 29, at 266.
38. 331 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., dissenting), denying reh ' to 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
39. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967):
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Gov-
ernment, the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.
[Vol. 61
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Nothing in this utterance suggesis that Justice Brandeis thought an
individual possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid
thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations. I suggest
he intended to include a great many foolish, unreasonable, and even
absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical treat-
ment even at great risk.40
One ramification of the right to privacy cases was increased recognition of
the right to refuse medical treatment. A New Jersey court analogized to Roe v.
Wade in In re Quinlan,41 recognizing the right to decline medical treatment
under some circumstances as an element of the right to privacy. The Quinlan
court weighed the state interest in preserving life against the patient's privacy
right. The court concluded that the right grows and the state interest weakens
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis becomes more
pessimistic. There comes a point, then, when the individual's rights prevail.42
Thus, the Quinlan court considered the physical condition of tile patient and
the type of treatment needed as essential factors to be weighed in the balanc-
ing process.
Several courts have allowed patients not facing a dim prognosis to refuse
medical treatment. In these cases the patient's right to be free of bodily inva-
sion was respected even though the treatment could have prevented death.
The courts in Lane v. Candura43 and In re Quackenbush44 refused to authorize
amputation of patients' gangrenous limbs. The court in In re Yelter stated that
the right to privacy includes a right to die even though the decision might be
foolish, unwise, or ridiculous. 45 Other courts, however, have balanced the in-
terests involved and reached a different result to prevent a patient's death.46
40. 331 F.2d at 1017 (Burger, J., dissenting).
41. 70 N.J. 10, 38-42, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (1976). The court appointed the father as guard-
ian of his daughter, who was in a persistent vegetative state, and authorized suspension of ex-
traordinary medical procedures. The court's recognition of this right to refuse treatment implies
that the patient's right to make such a decision is a "fundamental" one. According to Professor
Tribe:
Of all decisions a person makes about his or her body, the most profound and intimate
relate to two sets of ultimate questions: first, whether, when, and how one's body is to
become the vehicle for another human being's creation; second, when and how--this
time there is no question of "whether"-one's body is to terminate its organic life.
L. TRIBE, supra note 29, at 921.
42. 70 N.J. at 41,355 A.2d at 664. In Quinlan the life support system constituted a significant
bodily invasion. The patient was in a chronic vegetative state with little or no chance of
improvement.
43. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
44. 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978) (extent of bodily invasion
involved was sufficient to render the state interest in preservation of life inferior to patient's pri-
vacy right).
45. 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623 (C.P. Northampton County 1973). The patient in Yetter re-
fused to authorize either a surgical biopsy or any additional surgery needed as a possible treat-
ment for breast cancer. Although she was a patient of a state hospital and diagnosed as
schizophrenic, the court found that, at the time of her decision, she was lucid, rational, and under-
stood the consequences. The court thus refused to compel treatment.
46. See Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000,
1009 (D.C. Cir.) (final and compelling reason for authorizing blood transfusion was that a life
hung in the balance), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Heston, 58 NJ. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (interest of hospital, staff, and state in preserving life
19831
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The interests involved in forced feeding and compelled medical treatment
are similar. For this reason, courts are tempted to rely on the right to refuse
treatment cases as precedent in cases involving forced feeding. Forced feeding
is closely analogous to medical treatment when the former procedure becomes
necessary to protect the inmate's health and sustain his life. At that time, the
inmate is like the patient who must submit to treatment or surgery to save his
life. But there are also significant differences between the two. One obvious
dissimilarity is that forced feeding becomes necessary because of the inmate's
own omission. The patient, on the other hand, has not deliberately placed
himself in the position of needing medical treatment. A second difference is
that the inmate is in the custody of the state. The patient, however, may
choose to enter or not to enter a hospital.
Despite these differences, in analyzing the issues raised by forced feeding
it is useful to consider the state interests identified in the right to refuse treat-
ment cases. These state interests must be examined, however, in the particular
context of a hunger strike during incarceration. 47 The two most compelling
state interests discussed in right to refuse treatment cases are the prevention of
suicide and the preservation of life.48 A third state interest in orderly prison
warranted blood transfusion); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42
NJ. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (per curiam) (court ordered blood transfusion because welfare of
pregnant mother and child inseparable), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
For a general discussion of the right to refuse medical treatment, see Bryn, Compulsory Lie-
saving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1975); Cantor,.4 Patlent'r
Decision to Decline Ljfe-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of
Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228 (1973); Richards, Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die and the
Meaning ofLffe: A Morallnalysis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327 (1981); Comment, The Right of
Privacy and the Terminally Ill Patient: Establishing the 'Right to Die," 31 MERCER L. REv. 603
(1980).
47. Issues in right to refuse treatment cases have also been used to analyze a death row in-
mate's right to refuse appeal. See Note, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Deci-
sion?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 575 (1981).
48. These two state interests were identified in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). The question presented to the court was
whether to order treatment of Joseph Saikewicz (who had leukemia) with chemotherapy, a
method that involves significant side effects and discomfort. Saikewicz was sixty-seven years old,
profoundly mentally retarded, and a resident of state institutions since 1923. The court held that
his rights to privacy and self-determination were entitled to protection. Because Saikewicz was
incompetent, a guardian was appointed to ascertain his interests and preferences. There was suffi-
cient evidence to support the guardian's determination that Saikewicz would have refused treat-
ment.
Two additional state interests were discussed in Sailkewicz, but received little attention in the
three forced feeding cases. The first is maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion. Several courts that authorized medical treatment emphasized the responsibility of the hospi-
tal and doctors to care for their patients. See Application of the President & Directors of
Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (patient is hospital's responsibility), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971) (hospital, acting as an involuntary host, should be permitted to act according to profes-
sional standards). Cf. In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623 (C.P. Northampton County 1973)
(patient committed to state hospital for mental illness allowed to refuse unrelated treatment: "the
present case does not involve a patient who sought medical attention from a hospital and then
attempted to restrict the institution and physicians from rendering proper medical care.").
This interest was not discussed in Prevatte, White, or Chapman. In those cases, the inmate
did not refuse necessary medical treatment after voluntarily entering a hospital, Professional eth-
ics, nevertheless, must be considered since the hunger striking inmate will probably be transferred
to a prison hospital when he exhibits symptoms of starvation. The physician faces an ethical and
[Vol. 61
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administration becomes relevant when the analysis shifts from refused medical
treatment to forced feeding of inmates.
The first state interest, the prevention of suicide,49 was the basis of the
Chapman court's decision.50 Equating the inmate's refusal to eat with slow
suicide, the court found that the right to privacy does not include the right to
commit suicide. Suicide is neither a fundamental right nor implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty; it is therefore not protected by a guarantee of personal
privacy. The court further stated that "[t]o characterize a person's self-de-
structive acts as entitled to that Constitutional protection would be ludi-
crous," 5 1 particularly when the state has a duty to protect persons in its
custody. In support of its condemnation of suicide, the court cited statutes
prohibiting suicide and cases illustrating that suicide is a "grave public
Wrong." 52
moral dilemma when faced with the choice between the risks and invasive nature of forced feed-
ing, on the one hand, and the death of the inmate, on the other. He or she may be given statutory
authority to proceed with medical treatment without the inmate's consent. For example, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 148-46.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981) authorizes the chief medical officer of a prison hospital
or institution to give consent on behalf of a prisoner who refuses to consent to treatment of an
intentionally self-inflicted injury. The constitutionality of this statute has not been tested. On the
other hand, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-22.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981) requires inmate consent for surgery
except in emergency situations.
Another state interest articulated in Saikewicz is the protection of innocent third parties. Sev-
eral courts have considered the effect of the patient's death on dependent minors in deciding
whether to compel medical treatment. This extension of theparenspatriae doctrine provided the
basis for several decisions upholding forced treatment. See Application of the President & Direc-
tors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (state as parens patriae will not allow
parent to abandon child), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (blood transfu-
sion necessary to save life of mother and unborn child). But see In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372
(D.C. 1972) (children's material needs taken care of so court did not authorize father's treatment).
The Prevatte court considered the inmate's lack of dependents. The White and Chapman courts
did not refer to the inmate's marital or parental status.
The states are concerned with preventing economic and emotional abandonment of minor
children. Cantor, supra note 46, at 231-35. An inmate's circumstances suggest a modified evalua-
tion of this interest. Because he is incarcerated, the inmate may have little to contribute to his
dependents' financial support. Many inmates' children are already supported by the state through
governmental assistance programs. While in prison, an inmate is also limited in his ability to
participate in family activities. The family's deprivation is, of course, dependent on the length of
the inmate's sentence.
Assuming that the death of an inmate who stops eating would be harmful to his child, courts
should question whether the state interest in the protection of minors justifies intervention in a
hunger strike. It may be instead only one factor to consider in balancing the individual's right to
privacy against the interests of the state.
49. One author suggests that a court's labelling of the refusal of treatment as suicide may be
determinative: "It will be submitted that where there is an approximate equilibrium between
these [personal] rights and [state] interests, courts often ground their decisions upon whether they
are able to characterize the patients' actions as attempted suicide." Note, Suicide and the Compul-
sion to Lfesaving Medical Procedures: An Analysis fthe Refusal 0/Treatment Cases, 44 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 285, 286 (1978).
50. The court noted that Chapman expressed an intention to commit suicide. 87 A.D.2d at
67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
51. Id at 68-69, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
52. Id, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625-26. Death by self-imposed starvation is within the legal defini-
tion of suicide expressed by the Supreme Court: "In the popular, as well as the legal, sense,
suicide means, as we have seen, the death of a party by his own voluntary act. . . ." Bigelow v.
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284, 287 (1876). The inmate who refuses to eat will eventually
cause his death by voluntary omission. The starving inmate may not really intend to die; he may
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Antipathy toward suicide stems from both religious beliefs5 3 and the Eng-
lish common law, which attached both criminal and civil penalties to suicide
or attempted suicide.54 Public attitudes toward the act, however, have mark-
edly changed in recent years.55 This is illustrated by changes in the criminal
law that make suicide no longer punishable.5 6 In the majority of states at-
tempted suicide is no longer forbidden by the criminal law.57 Reflecting this
change in societal attitude, the Model Penal Code does not recognize suicide
or attempted suicide as a crime.58 Continued public concern is illustrated,
however, by state statutes that prohibit aiding and abetting suicide and allow
the use of force to prevent suicide.59
Although attitudes toward suicide may have changed, an inmate who
commits a suicidal act differs from his counterpart outside the prison environ-
ment. Because the act occurs during incarceration, an additional conside'a-
tion is whether the state's duty to care for persons in its custody includes an
affirmative duty to prevent suicide.60 Several decisions indicate that prison
officials must exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to the inmate when a
self-destructive act is foreseeable.61 Violation of this duty may result in civil
instead seek to elicit a response from the public or prison administrators. This distinction, how-
ever, is arguably insignificant, since the inmate intentionally deprives himself of food, knowing
that this deprivation will result in death. Thus, the inmate's refusal of food qualifies as a suicidal
act.
53. N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW 248-50 (1961). One who committed
suicide was traditionally denied burial rights.
54. Blackstone recorded that the body was buried in the highway with a stake driven through
it. Id at 233-36. Suicide resulted in forfeiture of goods to the king if the suicide was not a result
of insanity. G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 261-64 (1957).
55. Cantor, supra note 46, at 245.46. See generally Comment, The Punishment of Suicide-A
Needjor Change, 14 VILL. L. REv. 463 (1969).
56. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw § 74, at 568 (1972). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17.1
(1981) abolishes the common-law crime of suicide as an offense.
57. According to the American Law Institute, in 1980 thirty-four enacted or proposed codes
contained references to offenses related to suicide. None treated attempted suicide as a crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 comment 2, at 94 & n.10 (1980); see also G. WILLIAMS, stra note
54, at 289. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated in State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d
854 (1961), that an attempt to commit suicide is an indictable offense. Since suicide is no longer a
crime in North Carolina, see supra note 56, however, attempted suicide is no longer an offense.
"To constitute a criminal attempt, it is necessary that the act which is attempted be a crime." I R.
ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 155 (1957), cited with approval in Wil.
lis, 255 N.C. at 474, 121 S.E.2d at 854-55. But see Penney v. Municipal Court, 312 F. Supp. 938
(D.N.J. 1970) (constitutional challenge to state penal legislation against attempted suicide dis-
missed; court lacked jurisdiction for want of federal question).
58. "[I]t is clear that the intrusion of the criminal law into such tragedies is an abuse."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 comment 2, at 94 (1980).
59. Eg., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2505 (Purdon 1973) (causing another to commit suicide is
criminal homicide; intentionally aiding or soliciting suicide is a felony); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.12
(West 1982) (intentionally assisting person to take his own life is a felony). For additional discus-
sion and listing, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 comment 2; Note, Suicide and the Compulsion of
Lfesaving Medical Procedures: An Analysis of the Refusal of Treatment Cases, 44 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 285, 306 nn. 118-19 (1978).
60. There is a duty owed by one who takes custody of another to preserve him from unneces-
sary harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
61. See Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321,
124 S.E.2d 409 (1962); Dezort v. Village of Hinsdale, 35 IMI. App. 3d 703, 342 N.E.2d 468 (1976).
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liability.62 For example, in Dezort v. Village of Hinsdale the court reversed a
summary judgment for the defendant in a wrongful death action in which a
police officer who knew the jail inmate to be suicidal had neglected to remove
the inmate's belt.63 The sheriffs liability was a question for the jury in Wilson
v. Sponable, in which an inmate attempted to strangle himself with gauze.64 It
is unclear, however, whether this duty extends beyond a search for dangerous
objects and observation to include more intrusive acts.
Since the social and criminal stigma surrounding suicide is becoming less
severe, the policies underlying governmental intervention must be examined
to determine if they warrant intervention in an inmate's hunger strike. Gov-
erment action is generally for the purpose of securing assistance for the indi-
vidual. This assistance is justified when it prevents an irrational act from
resulting in death. 65 It is widely recognized that many attempts at suicide are
cries for help rather than determined efforts to die.66 The behavior may be
impulsive, or it may result from temporary depression.67 Sound policy sup-
ports state intervention in such cases. Prison officials, therefore, have a duty to
prevent impulsive acts with such serious and irreparable consequences. In-
mates who hang themselves, slash their wrists, or set fire to their cells usually
do not have an opportunity to reevaluate their decision. The daily refusal to
eat, on the other hand, is a choice that tests the sincerity and stability of an
inmate's commitment to his hunger strike.6 8 The hunger strike is not an in-
stantaneous act that can result in immediate, extreme harm. The inmate has a
chance to change his mind and reverse the physical toll of the hunger strike.69
Unlike a rash attempt at self-destruction, a hunger strike involves prolonged
commitment and physical endurance. 70
A second reason for the state interest in preventing suicide involves the
large number of people who kill themselves each year.71 The sheer frequency
62. See Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962); Dezort v. Village of
Hinsdale, 35 Ill. App. 3d 703, 342 N.E.2d 468 (1976); Wilson v. Sponable, 81 A.D.2d 1, 439
N.Y.S.2d 549, appeal dismissed, 54 N.Y.2d 834 (1981).
63. 35 IlL. App. 3d 703, 712, 342 N.E.2d 468, 475 (1976).
64. 81 A.D.2d 1, 5-6, 439 N.Y.S.2d 549, 552, appeal dismissed, 54 N.Y.2d 834 (1981).
65. Cantor, supra note 46, at 256.
66. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 285.
67. Id at 292.
68. Zellick, Forcible Feeding of Prisoners: An Examination of the Legality of Forced Therapy,
1976 PuB. L. 153, 171-72.
69. Up to a point, the effects of starvation are reversed by eating.
70. The physical effects of starvation are painful. After three weeks of lack of food the body
goes into a "starvation adoptive state." Interview with Dr. Lawrence J. Hak, Associate Professor,
School of Pharmacy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill (Sept. 21, 1982).
The condition becomes critical when there is a loss of 30% lean body mass (protein). Steffee,
Malnutrition in Hospitalized Patients, 244 J. AM. MED. ASs'N 2630, 2633 (1980). At approxi-
mately 42 days, nystagmus, a loss of muscular control due to severe vitamin deficiency, occurs.
Nystagmus is manifested by eye gyration, vomiting, and dizziness. These physical reactions end
after four or five days and are followed by slurred speech, failed hearing, and slow blindness.
Finally, there is unconsciousness. In 1920, Terence MacSwiney, an Irish hunger striker, fasted for
74 days before dying. Ajemian, Ready to Die in the Maze, TIME, Aug. 17, 1981, at 46, 47.48.
71. Cantor, supra note 46, at 256-57.
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of suicide in our society indicates that it is a serious problem.72 Accordingly,
suicide clearly warrants government concern. Although hunger strikes raise
serious difficulties in prisons when they occur, inmate starvation does not
reach the statistical proportions of irrational acts of self-destruction. Of those
inmates who begin a hunger strike, many voluntarily abandon it because of
the discomforting physical effects of starvation.73 Thus, while there is ample
basis to justify governmental intervention in attempted suicide cases and to
impose a duty on prison officials to prevent suicide, this basis may be inade-
quate to justify forced feeding of an inmate.
The second intexest addressed in most right to refuse treatment cases is
the state's interest in preserving life. The interest was rejected as not compel-
ling in Prevatte. The interest in preserving life, however, was a consideration
in Chapman and the basis for the court's decision in White. Noting that cot'
cern for life is at the core of civilization, the White court conceded that it may
be subordinate when a patient faces certain and painful death. The court
concluded, however, that the state interest in preservation of life is determina-
tive when applied to an inmate who is making an unpredictable, emotional
protest.74
The state's interest in preserving life was one of the qualifying factors in
Roe . Wade.75 This was manifested by the Court's concern for the mother's
health and the potentiality of life. Concern for preservation of life is also illus-
trated by criminal law and state police power, which focus on ensuring public
safety.76 If one accepts the premise that such governmental authority rests on
the individual's desire for bodily safety, the assumption is no longer operative
when one chooses to decline medical treatment or food. At this point new
interests of bodily autonomy, also deserving of protection, arise.77
Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz identified the preservation of life as
the most significant of the state interests asserted, it refused to order chemo-
therapy treatment for a person in state custody. The court noted that this in-
terest must be reconciled with the interest of the individual: "There is a
substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human life be saved where
the affliction is curable, as opposed to the State interest where, as here, the
issue is not whether but when, for how long, and at what cost to the individual
that life may be briefly extended." 78 According to the Saikewicz rationale, the
72. In 1978, 12.5 deaths per 100,000 people were a result of suicide. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1981, at 75
(102d ed. 1981). In 1981, there were 28,100 recorded deaths by suicide in the United States. Fur-
thermore, for each recorded suicide, 50 to 100 more are estimated to have been attempted. Blake,
Going Gentle into That Good Night, TIME, Mar. 21. 1983, at 85.
73. White voluntarily ended his hunger strike. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Prevatte started eating, then stopped again. See supra note 6.
74. 292 S.E.2d at 58.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
76. Cantor, supra note 46, at 243.
77. Id
78. 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (1977).
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state interest in preserving the inmate's life would be controlling if the threat
to life results from a voluntary decision to stop eating. The "affliction" in such
a case is both "curable" and is caused by the inmate's own omissions.
State interest in the preservation of life, however, has not always been
determinative when there is a positive prognosis. A decisive factor in applying
the balancing test is the magnitude of the bodily intrusion. The courts in In re
Quackenbush79 and Lane v. Candura8s based their decisions on the extensive
bodily invasion involved in the amputation of a gangrenous limb. These
courts declined to authorize surgery, even though it was necessary to save the
patients' lives. In deciding whether to compel an inmate to undergo hemodial-
ysis, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that the state interest in
preservation of life and the inmate's interest in avoiding significant noncon-
sensual invasion of his bodily integrity yield a very close balance of interests.81
The court pointed out that, although hemodialysis does not involve substantial
pain or amputation of a limb, the invasion is great. It is a complex procedure
that requires the patient's commitment and endurance.
These cases suggest that the procedure used to force feed should be con-
sidered in evaluating the prisoner's right to be free from bodily intrusion.
There are two methods that may be used to nourish an inmate who refuses to
eat. The first method is the insertion of a catheter into the major blood vessel
that leads into the heart, which requires precise implantation. An alternative
method is the insertion of a nasal gastric tube through the nose and into the
stomach. Both procedures involve significant risks and may cause infection or
even death.8 2 In addition, the inmate will probably resist. If he does, he will
have to be sedated or restrained while being artificially fed. Because constant
infusion is needed to maintain life, the restraint or sedation would be neces-
sary for a prolonged period.8 3 Thus, the magnitude of the bodily invasion
may be sufficient to override the state interest in preserving lifi.
79. 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County CL 1978).
80. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378 n.2, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 n.2 (1978).
81. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979).
82. The catheter must be cleaned daily to prevent septicimia, a life-threatening infection.
Both implantation and cleaning require patient cooperation. Risk of both infection and puncture
of the vein are substantial. See M. Shils, ParenteralNutrition, in MODERN NuTRITION IN HEALTH
AND DISEASE 1125, 1129-30 (6th ed. 1980).
The nasal gastric tube may choke a resisting patient and cause vomiting. Regurgitation may
result in aspiration of the solution into the patient's lungs, possibly causing pneumonia. Without
immediate appropriate care aspiration involves serious complications. Interview with Dr. Law-
rence J. Hak, supra note 70.
Use of a peripheral venous site for catheter implantation, such as an arm or leg, is not practi-
cal. Because of the solution's high concentration, there is a significant risk of phlebitis (inflamma-
tion of the vein). This method would require continual changes of the site. With the slightest
movement, the inmate could pull the needle out. Id For a description of the effects of forced
feeding on prisoners in England, see Zellick, supra note 68, at 156-59.
83. The resisting inmate can pull either the catheter or the nasal gastric tube out of his body.
Unless he is too weak to resist, the only way to force feed is to physically restrain or sedate the
inmate for the extended period of time needed to provide nourishment. Both procedures require
the infusion to run constantly until the inmate chooses to eat. Interview with Dr. Lawrence J.
Hak, supra note 70. Ironically, if the physician waits until the inmate is too weak to resist, there is
a high risk that the patient will die from the artificial feeding itself. Id
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There is an additional factor, however, in examining the state interest in
preserving a hunger striker's life. Within the penal institution, this interest is
evidenced by the state's duty to provide medical care to inmates in its cus-
tody.84 In Estelle v. Gamble the Supreme Court held that the government is
obligated to provide medical care for those whom it incarcerates. 85 Deliberate
indifference to those needs is a violation of the eighth amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.8 6 Both the Prevattes7 and Chap-
man88 courts mentioned the state's duty to render medical aid to the inmate in
their decisions.
Estelle established the state's duty to offer medical care to inmates; it is
questionable, however, whether this duty includes forced treatment.8 9 Argua-
bly, the eighth amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment
requires the state to offer medical care, and the inmate's right to privacy allows
him under some circumstances to refuse it. The extent of the state's duty, how-
ever, has been at issue with conflicting results. In Sconiers v. Jarvis a federal
prison inmate contended that the prison psychiatrist and physician had ad-
ministered medication to him against his will, in violation of his first amend-
ment rights.90 The trial court granted summary judgment for the physician.
The Sconiers court interpreted Estelle as creating a duty to provide medical
care regardless of consent.91 On the other hand, a civil rights action by a state
prisoner alleging that officials administered a drug without his consent was
held to state a cause of action in Mackey v. Procunier.92 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that the allegations raised serious constitutional ques-
tions regarding impermissible tinkering with mental processes. 93 The court of
appeals reached a similar result in Runnels v. Rosendale, noting that the right
to privacy may be violated by forced medical treatment of a prison inmate.94
The complaint, which alleged that defendant medical officials conducted a
84. See, e.g., State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 321, 255 S.E.2d 373, 378 (1979) (duty to provide
medical care to prisoners); Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 132 S.E. 291 (1926) (public must
care for prisoner who cannot care for himself); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-19 (Cum. Supp. 1981)
(describes the health services available to inmates).
85. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
86. Id at 104.
87. 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716.
88. 87 A.D.2d at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
89. See generally Comment, A New Perspective in Prisoners' Rights: The Right to Refuse
Treatment and Rehabilitation, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 173, 182-86 (1976).
90. 458 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D. Kan. 1978) (inmate had a history of paranoid schizophrenia and
psychotic behavior and was a threat to himself and others); see also Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp.
329 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (forcible restraint of inmate to give injection following inmate's refusal of
medication held not to constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
91. 458 F. Supp. at 40.
92. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (drug administered to inmate without his consent following
shock treatment). See also Baugh v. Woodward, No. 81-132-CRT (E.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 1982) (pur-
suant to consent judgment, N.C. Department of Correction adopted policy regarding involuntary
administration of psychotropic medication).
93. Id at 878. The court cited cases that developed the right to privacy in order to support its
statement. Id n.3.
94. 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974). The court also recognized a constitutional right to be free
from unprovoked physical assaults by agents of the state while in the state's custody.
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hemorrhoidectomy upon the inmate without his consent, stated a cause of ac-
tion.95 The court noted, however, that the surgical procedure was not required
to save the inmate's life, and did not further a compelling interest of the state
in prison procedure or security.96
A third state interest, the maintenance of order and discipline within the
prison, can redefine and limit the inmate's constitutional rights. 97 Both the
Chapman9" and White 99 courts discussed the restriction on constitutional
rights imposed by incarceration. The Prevatte court, however, did not recog-
nize these limitations under similar circumstances, stating that "a prisoner
does not relinquish his constitutional right to privacy because of his status as a
prisoner."1°°
The Supreme Court has differentiated between the constitutional rights
afforded inmates and those belonging to free citizens. Although inmates retain
constitutional rights, they may be limited. In Wolff v. McDonnell the Court
decided that inmates are entitled to certain due process rights in disciplinary
proceedings: "[Though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exi-
gencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons in this country."' 0 '
The Court in Wolff noted that there must be an accommodation between insti-
tutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution. The
Court addressed the constitutionality of censorship of inmate mail in Procunier
v. Martinez, holding that limitations on first amendment rights must further
government interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.10 2 The limitations
must be no greater than necessary to protect the interest involved. In Pell v.
Procunier the Court held that prohibition of inmate face-to-face interviews
with the press is not unconstitutional in light of alternative methods of com-
munication.10 3 Institutional considerations, such as security and administra-
tive problems, required that limitations be placed on such visits.' ° 4 The
inmate's right to privacy was also limited in Bell v. Wolfish.105 Balancing the
institution's significant security interest against the inmate's privacy interest,
the Court concluded that visual bodily cavity inspections may be conducted
95. Id at 735. The inmate also alleged that prison medical officials denied him analgesics
after surgery.
96. Id
97. See generaly Comment, A Review of Prisoners' Rights Under the First, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendments, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 683 (1980).
98. 87 A.D.2d at 70, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
99. 292 S.E.2d at 56.
100. 248 Ga. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 716. The court may have intended this statement to
extend only to acts that involve monitoring the inmate's physical condition against his will.
101. 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
102. 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). The Court held that censorship of inmate mail is permissible
only when the restriction furthers an important government interest unrelated to suppression of
speech.
103. 417 U.S. 817, 827 & n.5, 828-29 (1974).
104. Id at 826-27.
105. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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based on less than probable cause.10 6 Thus, the Court has determined that an
institutional restriction on a constitutional guarantee must be evaluated in
light of the objectives of prison administration: safeguarding security and pre-
serving internal order.'0 7 In defining both the necessity and scope of the con-
stitutional limitations, the Court has emphasized that deference be paid to
corrections officials' judgment.108
The hunger striker's effect on institutional interests should be examined to
determine possible limitations on his privacy right. In Commissioner of Cor-
rection v. Myers the state interest in upholding orderly prison administration
tipped the balance in the court's decision to compel medical treatment. 10 9
Kenneth Myers was a mentally competent, twenty-four year old male serving
several concurrent seven to ten-year sentences in a Massachusetts medium se-
curity institution. While in prison he developed a chronic kidney condition
requiring hemodialysis and medication. After approximately one year of
treatment Myers first withdrew consent, later resumed treatment, and then pe-
riodically continued to refuse treatment." 0° The lower court concluded that
Myers' refusal of treatment was a protest against placement in a medium se-
curity prison. 1
Subsequent to the superior court's order Myers was transferred and re-
ceived a kidney transplant. The court, however, thought it appropriate to ex-
press an opinion. 1" 2 The court concluded that, while the state interest in
preserving life was great, Myers' interest in avoiding nonconsensual bodily
invasion was greater because the magnitude of the invasion was extensive.' 13
The court nevertheless ordered treatment, based on the state interest in up-
holding orderly prison administration. According to the court, failure to pre-
vent the death of an inmate who tries to manipulate his placement within the
106. Id at 560. The Court also concluded that the detainee's privacy interest was not violated
by periodic room searches. Id at 557.
107. Id at 546-47.
108. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 827; see also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (wide-ranging deference accorded to decisions of prison
administrators).
109. 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979). For an analysis of Myers, see Case Comment,
Commissioner of Correction v. Kenneth Myers: An.Anomaly to Medcolegal Practice, 6 NEw ENO.
J. ON PIUSON L. 289 (1980).
110. 379 Mass. at 257-58, 399 N.E.2d at 453-54. Myers could survive three to five days if he
refused both dialysis and medication, ten to fifteen days if he took only the medication.
111. Id at 259, 399 N.E.2d at 454. Myers claimed the hemodialysis weakened him, thereby
reducing his ability to defend himself.
112. Id at 260, 399 N.E.2d at 455. The court said that Myers' attitude toward past treatment
and the need for continued medication made this a viable case. The court noted that, even if the
case were moot, the question was one of public importance and capable of repetition.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court later refused to render an advisory opinion as to whether
the Commissioner of Correction can by-pass judicial authorization for involuntary lifesaving
treatment in Commissioner of Correction v. Ferguson, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1252, 421 N.E.2d 444
(1981). The court stated that the parole of the inmate, who had refused to take insulin, rendered
the case moot: "[Tihe issue of the Commissioner's right to compel treatment, absent judicial ap-
proval, has not been fully argued in an adversary proceeding. ... Id at -, 421 N.E.2d at 446.
113. 379 Mass. at 265-66, 399 N.E.2d at 458.
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prison system poses a threat to prison order, security, and discipline.'" 4
Inmate refusal of medical treatment is undoubtedly of great concern to
prison administrators. In Myers the Commissioner of Corrections submitted
an affadavit to the court. He stated that an inmate who refuses life-saving
medical treatment presents him with two options if treatment is not author-
ized. Submitting to the inmate's demands would violate his responsibilities
and undermine his effectiveness. Allowing an inmate to die, on the other
hand, involves practical problems. Faith in the correctional system's ability to
protect inmates could be seriously undermined. The inmate's death could
cause an explosive reaction among other prisoners. Also, if the right to refuse
medical treatment is recognized, many inmates might mutilate themselves and
then refuse treatment in order to have their demands met.15
' Hunger strikes pose similar institutional concerns. Both Prevatte and
White began starving themselves to elicit certain action from the administra-
tion-Prevatte wanted to be transferred" 6 and White wanted prison condi-
tions changed. 1" 7 The Chapman court noted the disruptive effect of
Chapman's hunger strike on the procedures in his unit and on other
inmates. "18
The hunger strike, however, may be distinguished from self-mutilation or
refusal of medical treatment for an existing illness. The body's prolonged and
painful reaction to starvation may serve as a deterrent to many inmates at-
tempting to use the hunger strike for manipulation."19 It may be more difficult
to refuse food daily and to tolerate severe bodily reactions to starvation than it
is to commit impulsive acts of self-mutilation. The hunger striking inmate
also has the ability to reverse the consequences of his act. The inmate who
physically harms himself does not. Like White and Prevatte, many hunger
strikers may begin eating and voluntarily end the strike. A hunger striking
inmate, like any inmate refusing medical treatment, will affect the prison pop-
ulation and disrupt institutional procedures. Administrators, however, must
cope with the ramifications of either decision they make-whether they force
feed the inmate, or allow him to die.
The three state courts faced with the hunger striking inmate failed to ana-
lyze fully the complex issue presented. The Prevatte, White, and Chapman
courts touched on some of the interests that should be balanced to decide
whether to authorize forced feeding. None of the courts, however, sufficiently
evaluated the policies underlying the state interests or examined them in the
particular, unique context of a prison hunger strike. The Chapman and White
courts too quickly grasped the state interest in the prevention of suicide and
114. Granting the inmate's demands in order to obtain consent to treatment would also
threaten orderly prison administration.
115. 379 Mass. at 266-68, 399 N.E.2d at 459. The prison administrator's dilemma is great even
when the first set of demands is of a minor nature, putting pressure on the administrator to submit.
116. 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716.
117. 292 S.E.2d at 55.
118. 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
119. See supra note 70.
19831
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWV
failed to analyze the difference between a prolonged period of starvation, re-
quiring endurance and commitment, and an irrational, spontaneous act of
self-destruction. The state's legal duty to prevent an inmate from committing
suicide may well encompass nonintrusive acts such as observation and the re-
moval of harmful objects. Arguably, the reasons for state intervention in sui-
cide, however, do not warrant the highly intrusive act of force feeding a
competent adult who refuses to eat.
The Chapman and White courts emphasized the state's strong interest in
the preservation of life but failed to evaluate a countervailing consideration-
the magnitude of the bodily invasion involved in forced feeding. The proce-
dure is highly intrusive. It can be dangerous. 120 It is difficult to accomplish
safe artificial feeding with a resisting patient. Sedation and physical restraint
for the prolonged time necessary to force feed are themselves intrusive acts.
The procedure may even cause death. Although it is difficult to weigh the
interests of the state and the inmate, the courts must at least consider the inva-
sive nature of the forced feeding process itself.
Furthermore, the analogy drawn by the courts to the right to refuse treat-
ment cases was too simplistic. The Prevatte court accepted the analogy with-
out exploring possible differences. The Chapman court rejected it without
looking at similarities. The White court acknowledged the right to refuse
treatment when patients are terminally ill, but ignored precedent allowing pa-
tients to refuse life-saving treatment when bodily invasion was great.
The constitutional right not to be force fed raises issues not easily quanti-
fied or easily weighed. Each competing interest, however, deserves serious at-
tention. As with any issue in which personal rights are balanced against
competing state interests, much depends on the emphasis the court places on
each interest. The Chapman court denied that the right to privacy includes
starving oneself and focused on the state's interest in the prevention of suicide.
The White court's main emphasis was on the state's interest in the preservation
of life. The Prevatte court barely discussed state interests, and did not ade-
quately explain why Prevatte's right to privacy allowed him to continue with
his hunger strike.
It may be possible to develop a procedure that will accommodate institu-
tional needs, state interests, and the prisoner's right to be free from bodily
intrusion. Such a procedure could further the state's interest in preserving life
by setting up mechanisms that would allow continual efforts to persuade the
inmate to eat and to impress upon the inmate the seriousness of his choice. In
addition, a stated policy may protect the institution from accusations of ne-
glect. Ultimately, it would respect the inmate's right to privacy.
Two regulations might help alleviate the state's concern that hunger
strikes will be used as a form of manipulation. First, the state should not force
feed a competent adult who is fully able to understand the consequences of his
120. See supra note 82.
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refusal to eat. 121 Second, demands made by the hunger striking inmate should
not be met. This certainty of consequences alone may deter inmates who
choose to put the administration in the position of deciding whether to force
feed. The decision to ignore the inmate's demands will have already been
made. Inmates would know that hunger strikes would not be effective in
achieving a particular goal, thereby negating the very reason for refusing to
eat. Furthermore, if it is clear that inmates will not be force fed, prisoners will
not be able to threaten starvation while calculating that the state will eventu-
ally save their lives by force feeding. This knowledge, added to the physical
effects of starvation, would emphasize to the inmate the seriousness of his act.
The prison population would also know that the hunger-striking inmate is
making a conscious choice with full awareness of the state's position. Argua-
bly, this could lessen antagonism toward prison officials if the inmate dies.
Finally, the policy not to force feed recognizes the inmate's right to bodily
autonomy.
The state can fulfill its duty to provide medical care by nonintrusive
means. The administration should continue to provide food and drink accord-
ing to routine schedule or at any time an inmate terminates his hunger strike.
When an inmate's health declines he should be transferred to the prison hospi-
tal unit for periodic physical examinations.' 22 Because it may be difficult to
determine when an inmate's condition is serious enough to warrant hospitali-
zation, the prison administration should consult with a physician and consider
a hunger striking inmate's prior physical condition.
Several additional steps can be taken at the prison administrator's discre-
tion, both to effectuate a continued effort to convince the inmate to eat, fur-
thering the state interest in preserving life, and to protect the institution from
criticism. The hunger striking inmate's family should be notified and a family
member could be permitted to visit the inmate. This would accomplish two
purposes: a family member may convince an inmate to abandon his hunger
strike, and he or she could ascertain that the inmate is voluntarily refusing to
eat. In addition, the administration may allow a physician of the family's
choice to examine the inmate at the family's expense. A neutral party could be
appointed to visit the inmate periodically to determine the inmate's condition
and continued willingness to starve. Both the personal physician and the neu-
tral observer would serve to impress upon the inmate the seriousness of his
decision and to insulate the institution from accusations of mistreatment.
These additional visits, however, should be granted at the administration's dis-
cretion to prevent an inmate from threatening starvation to attain visiting priv-
ileges. 123 The visits might also serve as notice to other inmates that the prison
121. Although a psychological examination to determine competency is also intrusive, the de-
gree of intrusion is minimal when weighed against the state's interest in preserving life.
122. The state's duty to care for an inmate and its interest in the preservation of life balanced
against the relatively small bodily invasion of an examination should be sufficient to authorize this
procedure.
123. The prison administration could also use discretion to exclude visitors who present a
security problem.
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administration is attempting to prevent the inmate's death without abusing his
right to privacy.
The prisoner's right to privacy is illusory if the state is allowed to force
feed after an inmate has lapsed into a coma or can no longer physically resist
the procedure. The right to determine bodily intrusion must be respected al-
though the inmate can no longer actively assert his denial of consent. Simi-
larly, the state should not be able to punish the inmate for claiming his right.
Punishment of the inmate would effectively negate his right to bodily
autonomy.
Procedural rules such as these may help resolve the delicate balance be-
tween an inmate's privacy right and state interests in preventing suicide, pre-
serving life, and maintaining prison order. Modification may become
necessary as problems develop and abuses become apparent. As a compro-
mise, however, the suggested propositions serve several functions. Inmates,
the public, and prison administrators would be fully cognizant of the ramifica-
tions of an inmate's decision to proceed with a hunger strike. In addition,
knowledge of the certainty of the consequences may discourage use of a hun-
ger strike as a form of manipulation. The state could fulfill its duty to care for
those in its custody without intrusive bodily invasion. Ultimately, a hunger-
striking inmate would retain his right to privacy and take full responsibility for
his decision to refuse food.
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